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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
COURTESY MOTORS, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8877 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, Courtesy Motors, Inc., substantially 
agrees with the statement of facts contained in the brief 
of appellant, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, with 
the following exceptions and additions: 
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The transaction out of which this case arises involves 
Goffe Motor Company, an automobile dealer in Pueblo, 
Colorado, Dick A. Channel, the purchaser of the vehicle, 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, the appellant and 
purchaser of the contract of sale, and Courtesy :Motors, 
Inc., the respondent and subsequent purchaser of the ve-
hicle from Dick A. Channel. For convenience the parties 
will hereinafter be referred to as "Goffe," "Channel," 
"C.I. T." and "Courtesy," respectively. 
The deal for the purchase of the automobile by 
Channel from Goffe was made November 26, 1957. (R. 25) 
Instead of receiving on November 27, 1956, a down pay-
ment as represented to C.I.T. on the contract (Ex. P-1), 
Goffe had in fact only received a post-dated check in the 
amount of $853.85. (R. 49) 
On December 1, 1956, Channel picked up the automo-
bile in question and Goffe delivered to him all the docu-
Inents necessary to permit him to obtain title to the auto-
Inobile in his own name, free and clear of all encum-
brances. (R. 39) 
There is no evidence that Goffe ~fotor Cmnpany 
gave any instructions whatsoever to Channel with refer-
ence to his recording the mortgage. 
Subsequent to December 1, 1956, and prior to De-
ceinber 7, 1956, Goffe forwarded its contract with Chan-
nel to C.I.T. for purchase by C.I.T. (R. ±7) 
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Two or three days after December 1, 1956, Goffe 
learned fron1 the Firestone Company, where Channel was 
supposed to be mnployed, that Channel had skipped town 
and that the Firestone Company had found discrepan-
cies in its own books which had been handled by Channel. 
(R. 45, 46) On Dece1nber 7, 1956, Goffe called the C.I.T. 
office to find out what it should do about the Channel 
transaction, at which time C.I.T. recommended that Goffe 
file the Channel mortgage of record. ( R. 50) 
The automobile was subsequently purchased by 
Courtesy from Channel. E1nployees of Courtesy \vho 
handled the transaction did not have any actual knmvl-
edge of any outstanding 1nortgage on the vehicle and did 
not recognize that the bill of sale to the same (Ex. P-2) 
had been cut in two. (R. 83-85) 
The attempted recordation of the 1nortgage in no 
wise complied with the provisions of Section 13 ( 19) 
Chapter 16 of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated 
(1953 Cum. Supp.). (Ex. D-8) It has never been claimed 
by C.I.T. that Courtesy had constructive notice of the 
mortgage by virtue of the recording. 
C.I.T. has merely contended that Courtesy had im-
plied notice of its mortgage by reason of being put upon 
a duty of inquiry regarding the same, because of the muti-
lation of the bill of sale, Ex. 2. (R. 18) 
The automobile in question is in Salt Lake City and 
available for a mortgage foreclosure proceeding as well 
as the person who purchased the same from Courtesy. 
(R. 8, 9) 
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POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE, COURTESY OWED NO DUTY TO C.I.T. WHICH 
COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S ACTION 
IN TORT. 
POINT II. 
COURTESY, AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE IN 
QUESTION WAS SOLD TO CHANNEL, HAD NO NOTICE, 
ACTUAL OR IMPLIED, OF ANY EQUITY OF C.I.T. IN THE 
SAID AUTOMOBILE. ON THIS ISSUE REASONABLE 
MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER AND THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
POINT III. 
IF THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE 
RESPONDENT'S IMPLIED NOTICE OF THE INTEREST OF 
C.I.T. IN THE SAID AUTOMOBILE WERE SUCH THAT 
REASON ABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER, THEN THE QUES-
TION OF IMPLIED NOTICE IS NOT ONE FOR THE COURT 
BUT IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY. 
POINT IV. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT COURTESY HAS DE-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE, COURTESY OWED NO DUTY TO C.I.T. WHICH 
·COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S ACTION 
IN TORT. 
In selling the automobile to Channel, Goffe failed to 
follow the statutory procedures by which it could have 
protected itself and any_ assignee of the mortgage exe-
cuted by Channel. Having bungled the transaction and 
permitted itself to be deceived by Channel, Goffe, has 
sought to pass the resulting damage to Courtesy. The deal 
with Channel was dosed on X ovember 27, 1956. (R. 25) 
Channel took possession of the autmnobile on December 
1, 1956, and received all of the documents needed by him 
to apply for title in his own name, free and clear of all 
encumbrances. ( R. 39) 
Goffe made no effort whatsoever to see that a new 
title was issued in Channel's name evidencing the mort-
gage to either Goffe Motor Con1pany or appellant. Had 
Goffe followed the provisions of Section 13 ( 19) of Chap-
ter 16 of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, 1953, 
Cumulative. Supplement (Ex. D-8), this case would never 
have arisen. Channel would not have been in a position 
to deceive any one. He would never have received in his 
own hands the means of securing a clear title to the auto-
mobile, free from all encumbrances. Goffe would have 
presented the documents to the proper county official 
contemplated in said Section 13(19) and in due course 
a new title would have issued to Channel, showing the lien 
in favor of appellant. 
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John A. Wilson, the general n1anager of Goffe (R. 
24) ad1nitted at the trial that Goffe has now changed its 
procedure to comply with the statutory requirements and 
thereby protect the interests of the finance company in-
volved. (R. 58) · 
In addition, Goffe on N ove~nber 27, 1956, accepted a 
post-dated check from Channel. (R. 49) The company 
purported to assign the mortgage executed by Channel to 
C.I.T., representing that the down payment as indicated 
had been made, when, in fact, it had nothing but a promise 
to pay evidenced by the post-dated check. (Ex. D-6, R. 49) 
\Vhen Channel left the state it becan1e impossible 
to· record the mortgage in such a manner as to give con-
structive notire thereof to any subsequent purchaser of 
the vehicle. The above mentioned Section 13(19) could not 
be complied with. At that time, neither Goffe nor C.I.T. 
could comply with the provisions of Section 13(19) of 
Chapter 16 of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Anotated. That 
section sets forth in detail the procedure to be followed 
by the holder of any chattel n1ortgage on the n1otor ve-
hicle desiring to secure to hin1self the· protective rights 
afforded. No clai1n has eYer been 1nade that Courtesy had 
constructi're notice of the 1nortgage elai1ned by ·C.I.T. by 
virtue of the ineffectual recording thereof. C.I.T. has 
1nerely claiined that Courtesy had im,plied notice of the 
sarne by reason of being put upon a duty of inquiry be-
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A study of testimony adduced at the trial makes it 
aparent that C.I.T. is actually not the party in interest. 
While it is claimed it paid $2,000.00 for the Channel 
mortgage, it is evident that Goffe misrepresented the 
transaction and the document to the appellant by stating 
that it had received a down payment of $853.85, and that 
the transaction was recorded as a legal transaction and 
that title would issue showing C.r.rr. as lien-holder. (I1Jx. 
P-1) Wilson hedged when asked about repayment to ap-
pellant (R. 50-51), and never did say that Goffe wmtld not 
refund the $2,000.00 to the appellant. 
This is a case where Goffe b~~ its own negligent con-
duct made it possible for Channel to deceive Courtesy. 
Had Goffe exercised the ordinary and reasonable care 
becoming a dealer in motor vehicles and complied with the 
statutory requirements for filing the 1nortgage of record, 
neither the appellant nor the respondent would have 
been injured. 
Courtesy had no contractual relationship with Goffe 
or C.I.T. and no knowledge whatsoever of the mortgage. 
This is an action in tort. What duty did Courtesy owe 
to Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation 1 
POINT II. 
COURTESY, AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE IN 
QUESTION WAS SOLD TO CHANNEL, HAD NO NOTICE, 
ACTUAL OR IMPLIED, OF ANY EQUITY OF C.I.T. IN THE 
SAID AUTOMOBILE. ON THIS ISSUE REASONABLE 
MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER AND THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
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A comparison of the bill of sale from Goffe to Chan-
nel, Exhibit P -2, which was delivered to Courtesy, and 
Exhibit P-3, the con1plete Colorado form, indicates that 
Exhibit P -2 has been very skillfully and artfully cut in 
two. In granting the motion of Courtesy for a directed 
verdict, the trial judge in effect held that the evidence 
was such that reasonable minds could not differ in believ-
ing that Courtesy had no actual notice of any interest of 
C.I.T. in the vehicle, and in believing that the cutting 
of Exhibit 2 was so skillful that any reasonable person 
would be deceived. 
As already noted, there was no such recordation in 
compliance \\'ith the statutory requirements of Colorado 
as to give constructive notice to any third party of the 
outstanding mortgage on the vehicle. See again the re-
quirements of Section 13(19) of Chapter 16 of the 1935 
Colorado Statutes Annotated (1953 Cumulative Supple-
ment). An examination of said Exhibit P -2 reveals how 
skilfully the instru1nent was cut, so as to ren1ove any 
and all trace of the lien information. 
A person trained in the law and skilled in the use of 
legal verbiage 1night recognize the incmnpleteness of 
Exhibit P -2, but those who handled the documents were 
not so trained. The evidence shows, however, that those 
who handled the instrun1ent were without exception de-
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ceived by what had been done. Randy Larson, an experi-
enced salesman for Courtesy, knew only the bare re-
quirements for a valid bill of sale. He had never seen 
such a Colorado document before. He thought the instru-
ment contained the requisites of a valid bill of sale. He 
did not know the precise wording of the same, and as-
sumed it was sufficient. He was looking for names, signa-
tures and a notarization. (R. 84, 85) 
Scott Thorne, an mnployee of the State Tax Commis-
sion, also had occasion to pass on the sufficiency of the 
bill of sale. He testified that title documents are always 
examined to determine the validity of the title of the ap-
plicant, and that these documents were passed upon and 
accepted by him and the vehicle thereupon retitled in the 
name of Courtesy. (R. 99, 100) 
These trained and experienced personnel were mis-
led and deceived by Exhibit P-2. ~one of them noticed 
that the lien information had been severed therefrom. 
The trial court was fully justified in view of such Pvi-
dence in concluding that reasonable minds could not 
differ in believing that any reasonable person would be 
fooled thereby. The respondent's motion for a directed 
verdict was properly granted. 
POINT III. 
IF THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE 
RESPONDENT'S IMPLIED NOTICE OF THE INTEREST OF 
C.I.T. IN THE SAID AUTOMOBILE WERE SUCH THAT 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER, THEN THE QUES-
TION OF IMPLIED NOTICE IS NOT ONE FOR THE COURT 
BUT IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY. 
9 
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It is aximnatic that when facts are uncontradicted, 
or where but one conclusion or inference is reasonably 
possible from the evidence so that reasonable minds would 
draw the same conclusions therefrom, the question be-
comes one of law for the trial court. See 88 C.J.S. Trial, 
Sec. 210; Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 Utah 
273, 37 P. (2d) 362; Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Ctah 503, 56 
P. (2d) 1. 
The exercise by the trial court of its discretion in 
granting the respondent's motion to direct a verdict in its 
favor should not be disturbed unless such discretion has 
been abused. 5-A C.tT.S. Appeal and Error, Sec. 1612, 
p. 117. 
If the evidence regarding the transaction between 
Channel and Courtesy ~fotors, Inc., were such that rea-
sonable men might differ in their belief as to whether 
Courtesy was put on a duty of inqury, the case should 
have been sent to the jury. 
Counsel for C.I.T. contends in his brief at page 16 
that 
". . . the question of sufficiency of the notice 
required to reasonably put a person on inqury is a 
n1atter of law to be decided by the court." 
The appellant, C.I.T., on this appeal is asking the 
Court to reverse the trial court and enter a judgn1ent in 
it~ favor. The evidence in this case justifies no such re-
lief for all "·ho handled Exhibit P-2 were deceived. X ow, 
10 
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if the evidence is such that reasonable minds 1night differ 
in their conclusion, the question of 'vhether Courtesy 
had actual notice, or whether the notice it had was suffi-
cient to put it on a duty of inquiry, is ordinarii~, a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to decide. The general rule is 
stated in 9:2 C.J.S., Vendor & Purchaser, Sec. 37 4, p. 309: 
309: 
". . . where the evidence is such that only one 
conclusion may reasonably be drawn therefrom, 
the question is for the court, and in such a case it 
is error for the court to sub1nit the question to the 
jury. However, questions of fact as to which there 
is a conflict in the evidence, or the evidence is such 
that different inferences might reasonably be 
drawn therefrom, are ordinarily for the jury 
under proper instructions. Thus, the questions of 
whether one was an innocent purchaser, bona 
fides, adequacy of consideration, possession, no-
tice, whether the purchaser was put on inquiry, 
and whether inquiry would have resulted in notice, 
are ordinarily for the jury." 
See also 1l1cCarthy v. Lane, 16 X.E. (2d) 683 CI\Iass. 
1938); Walker v. ilfackey, 253 P. (2d) 280 (Ore. 1953); 
Three Six'ty Five Clttb v. 8lwslak, :232 P. (2d) 546 (Cal. 
1951). 
Certainly there was no basis for appellant's motion 
for a directed verdict, for without exception everyone 
that handled the bill of sale, Exhibit P-2, was deeeived by 
11 
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the artful cutting of the docu1nent. The trial court was, 
therefore, justified in denying appellant's 1notion for a 
directed verdict and in directing a verdict for respondent, 
Courtesy. 
However, even if the discretion of the trial court 
were abused in this matter, the appellant's motion should 
not be granted, but in that event the case, in accordance 
with the authorities cited, should normally be sent to the 
jury upon appropriate instructions, except for the rea-
sons set forth in Point No. IV. 
POINT IV. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT COURTESY HAS DE-
STROYED ANY SECURITY INTEREST OF C.I.T. IN THE 
AUTOMOBILE. 
The appellant, C.I. T ., has based its action upon the 
premise that Courtesy has destroyed an alleged security 
interest in the automobile in question. See Paragraphs 
6 and 7 of plaintiff'~ con1plaint. (R. 2) Assuming that the 
appellant had a valid security interest in the vehicle, 
wherein has the same been destroyed by Courtesy 1 
There is no question that the respondent, Courtesy 
purchased the automobile in question from Channel. That 
fact is admitted. But that does not of itself destroy any 
equity that C.I.T. may have had in the automobile. See 
United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 36 F. Supp. 79 (Dis-
trict Ct., D. :Minnesota, 1941), Appeal dismissed 121 F. 
(2d) 1019; .11 idland Nat. Rank & Trnst Co. Y. Peterso11, 
281 N.\\'. ()~3 (\ri~., 1938); L()/{dcn Y. Cooper, 100 P. (2d) 
42 (Wash., 1940). 
12 
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Courtesy, in its Answers to Interrogatories ~ o. G, 
(R. 8), has advised C.I.T. that the automobile was subse-
quently sold to one Lavell Witney, 155 Second A venue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 12, 1957. Even this 
additional fact does not constitute any destruction of the 
security interest of C.I.T. in the vehicle and give rise to 
a cause of action. See United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 
supra; Midland Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Petersen, 
supra; Louden v. Cooper, supra. 
"It is elementary that before a tort ean be 
committed there must be an invasion of a legal 
right. •*• 
". . . neither the sale by the Inortgagor of 
property subject to a chattel n1ortgage nor a 
subsequent sale by his vendee constitute conver-
sion of the property described in the chattelinort-
gage." United States v. Rogers & Rogers, supra. 
Has the automobile itself been destroyed~ No. Has 
the mortgage of C.I.T. (assuming its validity) been de-
stroyed'? No, it was admitted in evidence. (I':x. P-1) Dot>s 
the security interest in the automobile arising from the 
mortgage still exist in favor of C.I.T. ~ Certainly, unless 
cut off by a bona fide purchaser. 
The only possible way that any security interest of 
C.I. T. would be destroyed in this case is through a pur-
chase of the automobile by a bona fide purchaser. But if 
13 
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Courtesy is such a purchaser, as it so claiins to be, then 
there can be no cause of action against Courtesy. 92 
C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, Sec. 367, p. 300. On the other 
hand, if Lavell Whitney purchased the vehicle subject to 
the 1nortgage or knew of the same and was thus not a 
bona fide purchaser-and there is no evidence that such 
is not the case -then there is no reason why the appel-
lant could not foreclose its chattel mortgage and be made 
whole. No security interest of C.I.T. would be destroyed. 
It is ele1nentary that C.I.T., as plaintiff in this action, 
assu1nes the burden of proving its case. If it has a valid 
mortgage there is nothing to show that it cannot now 
proceed to foreclose the san1e. Until C.I.T. has made such 
an effort, and it is shown that its security interest in the 
automobile i0 destroyed as alleged, there is no showing 
that it has suffered any damage whatsoever at the hands 
of ·Courtesy. Until the vehicle has been placed beyond 
the reach of C.I.T. it cannot cmnplain of injury. Louden 
v. Cooper, supra. 
These circun1stances alone were justification enough 
for the trial court to grant the respondent's n1otion for 
a directed verdict. 
Sl~:MnlAR.Y 
In sun11nary. Courtesy :Motors. Ine., contends that 
an~~ dmnage to C.I. T. resulting in this case is due to the 
bungling, negligent conduct of Goffe. It is doubtful that 
C.LT. is even tlw real party in interest. In any event, 
Courtesy :Motors, Inc., is a bona fide purchaser of the 
autmnobile and was therefore justified in re-selling the 
14 
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same. It had no constructive notice of any mortgage in 
favor of C.I.T. nor was Courtesy ~lotors, Inc., put on 
any duty of inqury by reason of the cutting of the original 
bill of sale 1£x. P-2. On this latter issue, the Court was 
justified in concluding that reasonable minds would not 
differ. 
If the trial court abused its discretion and reasonable 
minds would differ as to the existence of Courtesy's 
duty of further inquiry, then the ease normally should 
have gone to the jury upon appropriate instructions, ex-
cept, however, that even if Courtesy had a duty of inquiry 
and in the exercise of that duty would have discovered 
the mortgage in favor of C.I. T., still, there has been no 
destruction of any security interest of C.I.T. in the ve-
hicle. The automobile and its last purchaser are in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. C.I.T. can, if it has a valid mortgage, 
proceed to foreclose the same. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mc~Y & BURTON 
I« ~/fP'-C.{; BY--------------------------------------------------~ 
MACOY A. McMuRRAY _ ( 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent) Courtesy Motors) 
Inc. 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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